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ABSTRACT 
Graph theory provides a useful frame- 
work for generating insights into prob- 
lems of sufficiency and optimality 
across a wide variety of physical relation- 
ships. Applied to the realm of grand strate- 
gy, this approach assists in developing a 
methodology for estimating the minimum 
level of forces required and determining the 
optimal deployments for the successful pur- 
suit of national security goals. In theory, the 
adoption of a defense-in-depth maneuver 
strategy provides the most efficient use of 
scarce resources. However, deterrence stabil- 
ity attenuates due to the absence of robust 
local balances of forces. Comparative case 
analyses of the Roman and British empires 
confirm the efficiency of depth defense, as 
well as the weakening of deterrence. Im- 
plications for U.S. policy are that, despite 
sizeable reductions, two regional wars can 
be fought and won, nearly simultaneously, 
even below base force levels. However, the 
deployments required to effect this grand 
strategy may make challenges to conven- 
tional deterrence more likely. Finally, it is 
demonstrated that small increases in forces 
above minimum requirements create a valu- 
able "margin of safety" and may significant- 
ly improve crisis and deterrence stability. 
The specter of decline confronts all great 
powers eventually. A substantial body of lit- 
erature, associated generally with theories of 
either power transition or cycles of relative 
power, addresses the onset of and efforts to 
cope with this unavoidable problem (Doran 
1971; Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 
1981; Kennedy 1987; Modelski 1987; Gold- 
stein 1988). Fundamentally, decline poses a 
strategic dilemma: that of either trying to 
maintain the status quo with scarce 
resources, even by means of preventive war 
(Gilpin 1981,191); or by retrenching, unilat- 
erally reducing spheres of influence.1 Both 
approaches can entail great risks. 
Imperial Spain, for example, faced with 
declining resources, attempted to hold all of 
the vast gains it made in the 16th century, 
and found itself consistently "over- 
stretched," unable to deter predatory 
attacks, or to defend successfully against 
them (Elliott 1991). The Soviet Union, on the 
other hand, recognized its material deficien- 
cies, and chose, a few years ago, to retrench 
preemptively, resulting not only in the swift 
breakup of its imperium, but also in the sub- 
stantial dissolution of its own polity. 
Of the two strategic approaches, "hold- 
ing the line" appears less risky at the mar- 
gin, perhaps because the effects of decline 
may be mitigated by spreading them over a 
longer period of time. The Spanish empire 
took nearly 300 years to collapse, from the 
loss of Holland in 1609 to the war with the 
United States in 1898. The Ottoman empire 
followed a similar temporal pattern of senes- 
cence. The former Soviet Union, which in- 
stead chose retreat, is absorbing the 
substantial, wrenching consequences of im- 
perial loss over an extremely short period. 
Even Britain, which withdrew skillfully 
from empire in the wake of the Second 
World War, suffered some of the immediate 
economic and politico-military conse- 
quences of strategic retreat, though they 
were cushioned by the willingness of the 
United States to fill the British void. 
Because of the seemingly high risks of 
retreat, even of partial withdrawal, this 
study concentrates its analysis on the stodgi- 
er option, maintaining the status quo, and 
upon the implications, for deterrence and 
defense, of adopting a grand strategy of 
"holding the line." It introduces first a math- 
ematical graphing methodology by means of 
which optimal choices for using scarce 
resources may be identified. Previous efforts 
along these lines have employed insights 
from geometry to develop a framework for 
successful defense at the tactical and opera- 
tional levels (Gupta 1993). This study focus- 
es upon the grand strategic level of analysis, 
and considers the prevention of war as well 
as defense against aggression. With regard 
to successful deterrence, special attention is 
given to the perceived need to achieve favor- 
able immediate or short-term local balances 
of forces (Huth and Russett 1984,1988; Huth 
1988). 
This new methodological approach to 
optimizing security strategies is then 
applied retrospectively to the two most 
notable historical cases of great empires, one 
primarily continental, the other maritime, as 
they confronted potential decline: Rome in 
the 4th century and Britain before World 
War I. Insights drawn from these studies 
will then be applied to help analyze the cur- 
rent situation of the United States in the 
post-Cold War world, with special emphasis 
given to the propriety of the current 
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American strategy of attempting to fight and 
win two regional wars nearly simultaneously. 
OF GRAPHS AND "PEBBLES" 
More than any other formal analytic frame- 
work, graphical analysis has long been effectively 
used to model a wide variety of physical rela- 
tionships (Kemeny and Snell 1962), from the 
feeding habits of rainforest animals (Harrison 
1962) and the optimization of municipal services 
(Tucker 1973), to the most efficient means for 
assigning radio frequencies (Hale 1980). 
This study views regions of the globe as 
nodes on a graph. An edge between nodes indi- 
cates their proximate relationship. Two nodes are 
adjacent if they are incident on the same edge; 
and any two nodes that are not adjacent are 
called separated. The distance between adjacent 
nodes is exactly 1. The distance between separated 
nodes is equal to the number of edges between 
adjacent nodes on the shortest path that connects 
them. 
Further, "pebbles," notional representations 
of the minimum forces needed in order to con- 
trol a node, are introduced and placed on the 
nodes of the graph. The pebbles may be moved 
from node to node along edges. Such moves on 
the graph are reminiscent of, and have their 
basis in, classical games such as Awari, an off- 
shoot of the Mankale'h family of games, includ- 
ing backgammon. In these ancient games, 
pebbles on a node may be swept up and distrib- 
uted among adjacent nodes by means of move- 
ment along incident edges. 
In this game, a pebble can move from one 
node to another; however, a cost of "1" is 
assessed for each pebble moved. Additionally, 
no pebble may move if it is the last pebble 
remaining at the node. With regard to lengthier 
moves, first k-1 pebbles are moved to an adja- 
cent node along the path to the terminal node. 
The cost of this initial move is k-1, as there were 
k-1 pebbles moved along the first edge. Then k-2 
pebbles are moved along the second edge, k-1 
along the third edge, etc.; until, finally, the last 
pebble is moved along the k-lst edge to the ter- 
minal node. The resulting structure is a string of 
k adjacent nodes, each of which possesses exactly 
1 pebble and is connected by edges. This forms a 
"bridge" of length k. The cost to build the bridge 
is the total cost of all of these moves. Cost is 
given as: 
Eq. 1: (Cost Determination) 
l+2+3+...+fc-l = k(k-l)/2 
The goal in moving pebbles is to place one at 
any prescribed node from a given initial configu- 
ration. If this can be accomplished, the original 
deployment of pebbles achieves the sufficient 
condition to qualify as a winning situation. Each 
pebble, therefore, represents a force able to seize, 
hold and control the territory represented by the 
nodes. Thus, a single pebble comprises all that is 
necessary, to a high degree of probability, to win 
a regional conflict at that location.2 It is assumed, 
for analytic purposes, that the composition of 
pebbles does not include allied forces. Con- 
tingency and military requirements planning 
must consider the possibility that a nation will 
have to fight alone on occasion, or that allies 
might prove either inconstant or ineffective. 
The bridge that is built to produce a win is 
consistent with notions of the strategic impor- 
tance, and costs, of secure lines of communica- 
tion, and has analogs in history. The closest 
parallel, no doubt, may be seen in the island- 
hopping strategy employed by the United States 
in the Pacific War against Japan (1941-1945), 
wherein "bridges" were built from one staging 
point to the next, with each providing security 
for the advance of further forces. Even in the 
recent Gulf War, where the Mediterranean was 
simply used for transit, significant forces had to 
be employed to keep the "bridge" secure at all 
times (Owens 1995,80). 
The more distant the target node, the greater 
the cost of reaching it in terms of time and 
resources expended. In this model, no further 
costs, such as placing a cost label on edges 
between nodes, or intra-nodal movement, are 
assessed. Even so, the costs of bridge-building 
are substantial. However the existence of the 
bridge has great importance in terms of develop- 
ing the capability for reconcentration of forces to 
meet a second conflict that arises even while the 
first is in progress, a scenario envisioned by the 
current U.S. warfighting doctrine of retaining the 
ability to fight two regional wars with near 
simultaneity. The costs described herein reflect 
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reasonably the concept of the loss-of- strength 
gradient (LSG) described by Boulding (1962).3 
Simply put, this formulation holds that the pro- 
jection of power entails predictable costs that 
increase, in the aggregate, with distance. 
The initial placement of pebbles can be cru- 
cial to producing a win without incurring unrea- 
sonable costs due to having a large number of 
required moves. Further, this study assumes that 
deterrence of aggression at any specific node can 
be achieved by an initial placement of pebbles 
that allows a win at less than a cost of 2; that is, if 
there is a pebble on the node in question, or if 
one may be deployed there at a cost of 1. This 
captures the theoretical notion that deterrence 
success depends heavily upon the immediate 
and short-term local balance of forces in a crisis 
(Huth and Russett 1984,1988; Huth 1988). It also 
recognizes that, while bridge-building may pro- 
vide, ultimately, an adequate form of defense, it 
nevertheless may not deter well in those cases 
where response times are slowed by distance 
factors. 
These distance factors imply a need to dis- 
tinguish between "simple" and "complex" 
graphs. The former possess a node adjacent to all 
others, the latter do not. Further, there are levels 
of complexity, measured in terms of the number 
of nodes at a distance of "2" from any given 
node. The key point introduced by this concept 
is that complex graphs contain the eventual, but 
inevitable need for bridge building. Thus, com- 
plexity entails varying costs for alternate initial 
deployment schemes, which can differ radically. 
In particular, when the need arises for move- 
ment to control a second key node, graph com- 
plexity greatly complicates optimality cal- 
culations. One means for dealing with complex- 
ity when contemplating initial deployments, we 
hypothesize, is to break down complex graphs 
into simple components, assuming that this 
approach will encourage deployments designed 
to minimize the costs of graph coverage. 
Current U.S. defense strategy, for example, 
calls for placement of sufficient force to allow for 
winning two regional wars nearly simultaneous- 
ly (Aspin 1993). In this instance, sufficient peb- 
bles must be initially placed so that a win can be 
achieved at any given location, followed by a 
win at any second location. Note that pebbles 
moved to produce the first win at the location of 
the initial conflict cannot typically be moved, as 
they will now be single pebbles incapable of 
movement on their own. However, these pebbles 
do provide a bridge along which any individual 
pebble may travel. In this case, the cost of using 
the established bridge is just 1 for each step 
along the way. Then, the cost of the original con- 
figuration is computed as the cost to achieve the 
win-win scenario. This is the worst-case cost for 
the choice of any ordered pair of nodes involved 
in the win-win scenario, where the costs of 
= minimum, and optimal deployment, to achieve a "win" 
*" = 1 move for»  ^- = 1 move for o 
n pebbles, and optimal deployment 
interval to achieve "win win" 
Figure 1. The "Pentagon" 
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producing the respective wins at the two nodes is 
minimized by following the shortest possible paths 
from nodes pebbled in the original configuration. 
A THEORETICAL EXAMPLE 
To illustrate the concepts and definitions 
developed above, one may consider the cycle 
graph on five nodes (C5, see Figure 1). No particu- 
lar meaning need be associated with the nodes of 
this pentagonal structure, though they could easily 
be related to areas of interest to the United States: 
the Western hemisphere, Europe, the Near East, 
South Asia and the Far East. The letters A through 
E are assigned to the five nodes, beginning at the 
top of the pentagon and proceeding in clockwise 
order. With regard to the issue of "complexity," the 
pentagon's is equal to 2, as there are two nodes at 
distance 2 in the graph for any given node. 
From the rules of movement, it should be 
clear that possession of either one or two pebbles 
will not allow for achieving even a single "win." 
Therefore, our illustrative analysis begins with 
three pebbles. To place three requires, initially, 
the use of 1, 2, or 3 locations. Though every pos- 
sible configuration is analyzed herein, one must 
also remain cognizant of the practical limitations 
that might develop in reality, as economic con- 
straints (unwillingness to pay host-costs) or 
political sensivities (such as to having non- 
Muslim troops permanently stationed on the ter- 
ritory of an Islamic state) may prevent de- 
ployment to certain nodes.4 There is only one 
way that three pebbles can be assigned to a sin- 
gle node, and two ways that two nodes may be 
used. These represent the two-fold choice of 
whether to select nodes that are adjacent or sepa- 
rated. Distractions of the left or right are not con- 
sidered as being distinct of the two nodes where 
one gets 2 pebbles and one receives just 1. If 
three nodes are utilized, there are again just two 
possibilities, either all contiguous, or one sepa- 
rated from the others. 
The latter two cases can be ruled out quickly, 
and may be illustrated by the 5-tuple configura- 
tions (11100) and (11010) respectively. In both 
cases three nodes are covered with no moves 
permitted, failing to achieve a win. When two 
nodes are utilized initially, a single pebble move 
may be made from the node containing 2 pebbles. 
This may be depicted as (20100)—>(11100)-1, or 
(20100)—>(10101)-1. The arrow indicates a 
move, and the nonparenthetic integer reflects 
accumulated costs. In total, four different nodes 
have been covered at a worst case cost of 1. No 
winning configuration appears. The case of adja- 
cent nodes is illustrated as (21000)—>(11001)-1, 
or (21000)—>(12000)-1—>(11100)-2. The cost is 
one for the first move in either case, but a second 
move is possible at an additional cost of 1. 
Again, exactly four nodes are covered, now at a 
worst case cost of 2. Still, no winning configura- 
tion emerges from these placements. 
Where all 3 pebbles are placed at a single 
node initially, there are more possibilities. Now, 
two pebbles can move to an adjacent node, and 
then a single pebble can be moved further. This 
is illustrated by (30000)—>(21000)-1 —>(12000)- 
2—>(11100)-3. Here, the worst-case cost is 3 to 
cover three nodes. Since the moves may also be 
made in the counterclockwise direction, the situ- 
ation may be alternately rendered as (30000)—> 
(2000D-1—>(10002)-2—> (1001D-3, again cover- 
ing three nodes at a cost of three. Together, at a 
worst-case cost of 3, all five of the nodes (A-E) 
have been covered in one sequence or the other; 
and a winning configuration is established by 
virtue of all the nodes being covered via this 
"depth defense" deployment of the pebbles. 
(30000) is a winning configuration whose 
cost = 3. 
Though a winning configuration emerges at 
the 3-pebble level, no "win win" scheme has yet 
been identified. Therefore, the analysis must pro- 
ceed to the level of 4 pebbles. In this scenario, 
only the case of the initial occupation of four 
nodes (11110) fails to achieve a winning configu- 
ration. In all other cases, a win with 4 pebbles is 
easily established. Costs for each "single win" 
option are given in Table 1. 
There are only two ways, though, to estab- 
lish a "win win" scenario with an initial place- 
ment of 4 pebbles. If all are placed at a single 
node, then regardless the order in which two 
nodes are named, it is possible to reach both. 
Either adjacent node is reached in 1 step: 
(40000)—>(31000)-1, or —> (3000D-1. Then, 
either (originally) separated node can be reached 
utilizing one or the other bridge in two addition- 
al steps, for a total cost of 3. If one of these sepa- 
rated nodes were the first named, then it could 
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Table 1. Winning 4-Pebble Configurations. 
COST CONFIGURATION 
1 (20110), (20200) 
2 (21010), (21001) 
3 (21100), (30100), 
(31000), (40000) 
4 (22000) 
be covered in 3 steps: (40000)—>(31000)-1 
—>(22000)-2—>(21100)-3. Then, if an originally 
separated node is named second, it can be 
reached in three additional steps utilizing an 
established bridge: (21100)-3—>(12100)-4—> 
(11200)-5—>(11110)-6. The win-win scenario is 
thus achieved for this configuration (all peb- 
bles on one node), and the cost for the double 
win = 6. 
The other way to achieve a win-win is by 
means of the placement (20200). The first chosen 
node (or conflict) can be reached at a cost of 1 in 
every case. A second occurrence anywhere may 
then also be reached, though the cost varies with 
the location. Cost analysis requires the consider- 
ation of two cases. The first named node may be 
adjacent to just one of the initially occupied 
nodes, in which case the second node can be 
reached in just one more step, for a total cost of 
2. Alternately, the first named node could be 
adjacent to both occupied ones. In this instance, 
referring to Figure 1, one might hypothesize 2 
pebbles on A and 2 on C, with a conflict erupting 
on B. Either choice of how to occupy that node 
(moving from A or from C) establishes a bridge 
(20200)—>(21100)-1, to the most distant node, 
which can now be reached in three additional 
moves (21100H—>(12100)-2—>(11200)-3—> 
(11110)-4. The worst-case cost to achieve the win- 
win scenario = 4. 
With a minimum number of pebbles needed 
to achieve a double win of 4, it is interesting to 
engage in some marginal analysis, to consider 
the effect, in terms of cost savings, of adding one 
pebble, for a total of 5. In this case, though, 
placement on only one or two nodes is consid- 
ered, reflecting implicitly the political or 
economic limitations on "overseas" basing that 
often arises in reality Given this restriction, only 
five cases require consideration: (50000), (41000), 
(40100), (32000) and (30200). Win-win scenarios 
exist in every case, but the costs are startlingly 
different. In the respective cases described 
above, the costs are 6,5,4,4, and 2. Thus, in light 
of the best deployment of 5 pebbles at two or 
fewer nodes, a modest increase in force size may 
generate cost savings of 50%. That is, cost comput- 
ed in terms of the required time to respond effec- 
tively to any threat. For deterrence stability, such 
a finding could have profound implications. 
The best-case scenario plays out as (30200)—> 
(21200H, and then the second named node can 
be covered by one step in either direction, with- 
out requiring the use of the bridge. Of course, 
the costs of increasing force size by one-fourth 
might generate domestic political resistance, if 
the only cost saving were a one-half reduction in 
response time in crisis. On the other hand, if 
such a marginal increase cut the likelihood of an 
outbreak of war, or other failure of deterrence, in 
half, then the gains might well be viewed as 
greater than the costs. 
The foregoing theoretical examples form the 
basis for the following case studies, which key 
on force minimization and optimization, for 
deterrence and defense. The situations faced by 
Rome and Britain, when their empires were ter- 
ritorially most expansive and their material con- 
straints were beginning to be sharply felt, have 
been chosen for comparative analysis. It will also 
be argued that the United States faces a similar 
situation in the post-Cold War world, with still- 
extensive commitments and interests coming 
into "tension with economically straitened 
circumstances. 
HISTORICAL CASES 
The Pax Romana 
At the height of its power in the 3rd century, 
Rome fielded approximately 50 standing legions, 
aggregating over 300,000 combat troops, exclu- 
sive of auxiliaries (Gibbon [1776]1937; Luttwak 
1976; Macmullen 1980; Delbruck [1921J1990). 
These forces deployed evenly to the many bor- 
der areas of the Imperium, providing Rome with 
Military Operations Research, Fall 1995 Page 7 
GRAPHING 
an explicit "forward defense" based on a doc- 
trine of positional warfare. Additionally, their 
presence at the marches of the empire encour- 
aged friendly barbarians to settle nearby creat- 
ing an "external depth" that further enhanced 
security (Ferrill 1991). Over time, though, the 
empire stagnated economically, and couldn't 
maintain the same large military machine that 
characterized its halcyon days. 
Thus, by the 4th century, the Roman armed 
forces had shrunk nearly in half, from 50 to 
roughly 25 standing legions (Luttwak 1976,189). 
Forward, positional defense grew infeasible. At 
this point, Constantine instituted quantum 
changes in Roman grand strategy, going well 
beyond the "shallow depth" hybrid defensive 
scheme advanced by Diocletian over a century 
earlier. Constantine directed the redeployment of 
the legions, roughly half in the environs of Rome 
and Northern Italy, the remainder in the vicinity 
of the city which bears his name. The defense-in- 
depth maneuver strategy that underlay this shift 
held that the legions would now be better suited 
to responding to any emergent threats around 
the perimeter of the empire (Jones 1964; Luttwak 
1976). This approach conceded that some territo- 
ry would be lost in the initial phase of conflict, 
but that it would be reconquered expeditiously 
For purposes of graphical analysis, each 
Roman "pebble" consists of six legions of regular 
field forces, or comitatenses. This figure derives 
from Gibbon's and Delbruck's accounts of the 
forces needed for the major campaigns of the 2d- 
4th century period. Of course, exact numbers of 
troops remain shrouded in obscurity, but the 
numbers of legions engaged often emerges with 
clarity. Again, as in the previous theoretical 
example, allied forces and barbarian levies, 
because of their unreliability, so well borne out 
historically, are not included in the "pebbling" 
process. 
Figure 2 depicts the strategic schematic of 
the Roman empire at its height, with key nodes 
set at the two capitals and all perimeter areas. 
Edges represent, and are in line with, Rome's 
principal roads and maritime lines of communi- 
cation. The compexity of this graph is three. 
Using the six-legion pebbling guideline gener- 
ates eight pebbles in the 2d century, four in the 
4th. Thus, at its greatest strength, the empire 
could continuously maintain enough forces to 
win a field campaign on each of its key nodes. 
The legions were indeed "legion." Two centuries 
later, though, four pebbles had to cover the same 
eight nodes. Was the Constantinian depth 
defense the correct answer for Rome, as Luttwak 
(1976) has argued? Was it optimal? 
Constantinian depth defense may be repre- 
sented, using Figure 2, by envisioning the place- 
ment of two pebbles each on Rome and 
Constantinople. This configuration does allow 
for the achievement of a "win." That is, these 
• = Constantinian Deployments O = The Hybrid Strategy 
 ^" = Cost of Defending Britian 
Figure 2. Strategic Schematic of The Roman Empire 
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forces may deploy to any region in imminent cri- 
sis or war. Response time to all locations, save 
for Britain, is 1 each, implying that deterrence 
ought to hold in these areas. Reaching Britain, 
however, entails a cost of 4, as a Rome-Gaul 
bridge must be established (1) and then a pebble 
can move from Constantinople-Rome-Gaul- 
Britain (+3, total cost of 4). If an edge existed 
between Gaul and Constantinople, the cost of 
moving to Britain would reduce to 3, but the 
interposition of the unfriendly, and unconquered 
Germans made this infeasible. 
Thus, the total cost of Constantine's depth 
defense is 9, and the strategy does not guarantee 
a "win win" situation either, although Britain is 
the only node that prevents this. The difficulties 
and costs of defending Britain had long con- 
cerned Roman leadership, leading early on to 
the creation of Hadrian's Wall, the Maginot Line 
of its day. Presumably, this fortification acted as a 
deterrent and force multiplier, freeing up the 
legionary field forces for the defense of the rest 
of the imperium. Interestingly, there are a variety 
of lower cost solutions to the Roman strategic 
dilemma. 
The first alternative strategy would keep 2 
pebbles in Rome, but only 1 in Constantinople. 
The 4th would deploy initially to Gaul. This cov- 
ers one more node initially, improving deter- 
rence, and reduces the cost of movement to 
Britain to 2. On the other hand, responding to a 
crisis on the frontier with the Persian Empire 
now costs 2. Total costs are 7 under this strategy. 
When win-win considerations are added, 
though, this strategy would leave 4 nodes 
beyond reach in the event of a second war, as 
opposed to the 1 (Britain) that would be sacri- 
ficed in the actual Constantinian strategy. 
Obviously, political importance was 
attached to the forces deployed in and around 
Rome, and it would be hard to conceive of a 
strategy that failed to retain substantial forces 
there. Nevertheless, for analytical purposes, it is 
interesting to consider a second strategic 
approach, with two variants, in which Rome 
alone, then both Rome and Constantinople are 
neglected. In the first variant, 2 pebbles each are 
placed in Gaul and Constantinople. The cost is 1 
to move to all nodes, except for North Africa, 
which has a cost of 3. Thus, the aggregate cost is 
8, marginally better than the actual strategy 
employed. With regard to fighting two conflicts, 
this strategy leaves two nodes vulnerable, one 
more than under Constantine's strategy; unless 
the first conflict occurs in North Africa, after 
which response to second conflicts grows prob- 
lematic. Thus, this strategy would likely require 
a willingness to sacrifice North Africa. 
For example, a first war in Britain leaves 
Iberia and North Africa open after the initial 
Gaul-Britain move. Similarly, a war in Asia 
Minor leaves Egypt and North Africa beyond 
reach. Finally, a war in Egypt would result in 
uncovering Asia Minor and North Africa. The 
problem with the Gaul deployment is that it 
makes bridge building to reach the second con- 
flict impossible (except if the first war is in 
Rome) when a bridge is required to move field 
forces to distant regions. 
The most effective "non-Rome" option for 
coping with the abovementioned situation 
would be to keep 2 pebbles in Gaul, but to shift 
the 2 in Constantinople to Egypt. This reduces 
total costs to 6, a one-third savings over the his- 
torical strategy employed. However, the prob- 
lem of covering the second conflict is double that 
of the Constantinian strategy. For example, a first 
war in Asia Minor leaves Constantinople and 
North Africa uncovered. If the first conflict is in 
the west, though, say Iberia or Britain, then only 
one node remains uncovered. Thus, this strategy 
would have reduced the overall costs of winning 
substantially, and only marginally worsened the 
empire's ability to respond to a second conflict. 
Of course, the dark political consequences of 
removing forces from the two capitals are hard 
to contemplate and would, undoubtedly, have 
been politically unacceptable. 
With this last concern in mind, returning 
pebbles to Rome, aside from its political attrac- 
tiveness, allows for introduction of the most effi- 
cient "one war" strategy. This consists of a 
hybrid of forward and depth defenses, with 1 
pebble each in Britain and Asia Minor, and 2 in 
Rome. In this configuration, the overall cost of 
dealing with one war anywhere is 5. Unfortu- 
nately, the response to the first war leaves four 
nodes open that cannot be protected in the 
event of a second conflict. Adding 1 more peb- 
ble in Rome would solve this problem, but such 
an increase would have strained the empire 
greatly. 
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On balance, the Constantinian depth defense 
strategy forms the most attractive option. Its 
seemingly high cost in winning one war is an 
artifact of the cumbersome moves required to 
defend Britain, where this analysis implies deter- 
rence would most likely fail. On the other hand, 
for purposes of coping with two wars, this strat- 
egy minimizes the vulnerable nodes (to one, 
Britain), a better result than any other deploy- 
ment scheme. No historical record suggests that 
the Romans employed graphical analysis in then- 
strategic planning; but it is interesting that they 
identified Britain as a particular defensive prob- 
lem, leading them to the creation there of one of 
history's more ambitious efforts in fortification. 
If the Romans demonstrated such refined 
strategic insight, then what accounts for the col- 
lapse of the empire? Ferrill (1986) argues con- 
vincingly that the fall of the empire resulted 
from a lessening of the military effectiveness of 
the legions. The move to depth defense caused a 
reshaping of the legionary forces to incorporate 
more mobile cavalry which, Ferrill argues, inad- 
vertently debilitated the Roman infantry by sap- 
ping its numbers. Gibbon ([1776]1909, 322) 
contends that the fall of the empire came soon 
after Roman infantry discarded their body armor 
(so that they could move faster on the march). 
Thus, Rome fell because its "pebbles" lost 
their value of "1." They increased mobility at the 
cost of fatally compromising their hitting and 
holding power. This problem does not appear to 
apply to the next, British, case; but it resonates 
with current debates about the appropriate 
"lightness or heaviness" that U.S. forces should 
possess in the post-Cold War world. In another 
respect, the Roman case also compares more 
closely with the United States than Britain, in 
that Rome combined land and sea power, while 
Britain remained essentially a maritime power, 
albeit one that could, when necessary strike 
powerfully on land. Finally, the British case will 
prove somewhat clouded, because of the pres- 
ence of a rapidly emerging rival (exemplified by 
the German maritime threat). Rome in the 4th 
century faced a multitude of smaller, potential 
threats, much as the United States does in the 
immediate post-Cold War period. 
The Pax Britannica 
Like Rome, Britain enjoyed a period in 
which it was a sole "superpower." In 1816, a 
year after the fall of Napoleon, the Royal Navy 
possessed two-thirds of the capital ships in the 
world. It outnumbered the Russian fleet, in terms 
of warships of 60 guns or more, by 5:1; France by 
4:1; and the United States by over 20:1. 
Additionally, Britain enjoyed almost equally 
favorable margins in smaller vessels such as 
frigates and gunboats (Modelski 1988). For com- 
parative purposes, though, in terms of setting 
the number of "pebbles," only British capital 
ships are considered, as were only regular 
Roman legions in the previous case. Smaller ves- 
sels are analogous to the Roman auxiliaries, and 
equally vulnerable. In the words of First Sea 
Lord Jacky Fisher, any moderate-sized opponent 
could "lap them [all] up like an armadillo set 
loose on an ant-hill!" (Kennedy 1976,216). 
In addition to its overwhelming naval mas- 
tery in the immediate post-Napoleonic period, 
Britain also enjoyed control of three-fourths of 
world trade. However, the Pax Britannica itself, 
which ensured the freedom of the seas and fos- 
tered trade openness, spurred growth at such 
rates that Britain itself could not avert a tendency 
toward relative decline. By 1860, its share of 
world trade had fallen to 25%, by 1900 it was 
17% (Kennedy 1976, 190). In terms of naval 
power, its share of global capital ships fell from 
nearly 70% in 1816 to 50% in 1860 and, in 1900, 
to under 40%. 
Like the Roman legions, the capital ships of 
the Royal Navy, early on, deployed to the vari- 
ous perimeters of the empire, providing a robust 
forward defense. For example, in 1848, four- 
fifths of the warships of the Royal Navy were 
stationed outside the home islands (Kennedy 
1976, 170). In terms of "pebbling," where six 
Roman legions comprised a force capable of 
dominating any given sector, the British 
Admiralty appeared to have followed a loose 
policy of amassing twenty-ship battle fleets dur- 
ing the age of sail, reducing this to eight in the 
era of steam propulsion and steel. These mini- 
mums needed for local dominance would give 
Britain an inventory of six "pebbles" in 1816, 
reducing to four by the turn of the 20th century. 
In this British case, the small professional army 
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Figure 3. Strategic Schematic of the British Empire 
is held constant, and is considered as a "projec- 
tile" fired by the Royal Navy into any given 
regional conflict; one, when properly supplied 
and supported, which consistently provided the 
empire with a high probability of success. 
Figure 3 presents the British strategic sche- 
matic, with nodes at all key reaches of the 
empire, which has a complexity of 2. Early in the 
19th century, the Royal Navy had the where- 
withal to remain on station with dominant forces 
at each of the six key nodes of the empire. By 
1900, though, down to four pebbles, small 
adjustments had been made. Instead of one peb- 
ble per node, two were kept in home waters, 
with one each in the Mediterranean and one in 
South Asian waters. This still had much of the 
appearance of a perimeter positional defense, or 
at least was no better than Diocletian's "shallow 
depth" strategy for the Roman legions. In 1905, 
though, Admiral Fisher, driven by his fear of dis- 
persing his scarce resources in the face of rising 
German naval power, moved to a full depth 
defense. In schematic terms, he placed three peb- 
bles in home waters, leaving one in the 
Mediterranean, and none elsewhere (Fisher 1919; 
Marder 1940; Kennedy 1976,217). 
Was Fisher right? Was his redeployment effi- 
cient? Optimal? The Fisher strategy of defense- 
in-depth could see to it that British forces arrived 
anywhere eventually. To achieve winning condi- 
tions against any one adversary, the "pebbling 
cost" of his approach amounts to 11, with 5 of 
this cost accounted for by movement to the Far 
East, 3 to reach the Cape of Good Hope and 2 to 
respond in South Asia. With regard to coping 
with a second conflict, Britain could reach any 
second war as long as the first one developed in 
South Asia. This would create a bridge which 
could then be employed to reach either the Cape 
or the Far East. 
The high costs of the Fisher strategy, and the 
conditionality of the "win-win" capability en- 
courage some application of graphical analysis 
in pursuit of more efficient strategies. The central 
problem to tackle in the British case is the great 
distance between Britain and the Far East. One 
solution consists of reducing the pebbles in the 
home islands to 2, and placing 2 in the Far East. 
This allows for a response time of 1 to any con- 
flict, with an aggregate cost of 4. The cost is the 
same if the Far East forces are stationed in either 
South Asia or at the Cape of Good Hope. 
Alternately, 2 pebbles each in the Mediterranean 
and at the Cape, or in the West Indies and South 
Asia, also have aggregate costs of 4. These latter 
two cases have the additional benefit of creating 
win-win situations, as they permit a successful 
response to any second conflict that arises, at 
worst-case additional costs of 3. 
Given the strategic imperative of balancing 
against the rising German threat, Britain would 
likely not have adopted either of the win-win 
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strategies, as each requires weakening the 
defenses of the home islands. Given the incredi- 
ble popularity of the "invasion scare" literature 
of this period, there can be no doubt of the 
domestic political constraints upon any effort to 
move the fleet to peripheral areas. However, it 
might have been possible to reduce the home 
fleet to 2 pebbles (from Fisher's 3). Then, with 1 
in the Mediterranean and 1 in South Asia, a win- 
ning situation could be achieved at a total cost of 
7, a 44% saving on the Fisher plan. Nevertheless, 
this scheme fails to achieve the conditions for a 
double win. 
To summarize, graphical analysis points out 
that Britain could have achieved a double win, 
and reduced its single win costs by 80%, by 
moving its fleet units to peripheral areas. This 
finding suggests that, under some circum- 
stances, defending forward, even when limited 
by straitened economic conditions, may prove 
superior to a pure depth defense. Aside from 
cost reductions, of course, this approach main- 
tains the kind of forward presence needed to 
shore up deterrence. As the American case 
unfolds, this insight about deploying forward 
may have particular value, as the United States 
suffers nothing of the sort of great power rivalry, 
or vulnerability to invasion, that Britain 
confronted, or thought it did, a century ago. 
Implications for the United States in 
the Post-Cold War World 
Can this graphing methodology, along with 
insights from the foregoing historical cases, help 
to determine the appropriate size of and optimal 
deployment scheme for U.S. forces? Or, more 
simply put, how many pebbles are needed, and 
where should they be placed? These questions 
may be answered explicitly, though the issue of 
quantitative requirements depends upon the 
definition of the force size necessary to achieve a 
probable win in any regional conflict. How 
much is an American pebble? For Rome, it was 
six legions of regular forces. For Britain in the 
age of steam and steel, it was eight capital ships, 
their supports, and an expeditionary force. An 
American pebble, however, must be more multi- 
faceted, comprising sea, air and ground forces. 
Perhaps the best guidance to determining 
the specifics of an American force sufficient to 
win a regional conflict comes from the "bottom- 
up" study prepared by Les Aspin. In it, the for- 
mer defense secretary argues first that, in order 
to win one regional conflict, the United States 
would have to maintain, at the upper level, 
standing forces of 5 divisions of ground forces, 
10 air wings and 5 carrier battle groups (1993, 
10). These figures include what is needed for 
standing treaty commitments (in Europe and 
Northeast Asia, principally) and for purposes of 
the rotation base (mostly in the continental 
United States). His analysis does not specify the 
amounts needed for the "win win" strategy, 
but implies that doubling the force is not quite 
necessary. 
Accepting Aspin's approach, one may then 
conservatively estimate total force requirements 
of 10 divisions, 20 air wings and 10 carrier battle 
groups, an amount that comes very close to the 
revised "base force" projections with which his 
study concludes (1993, 17). In actuality, though, 
U.S. forces will likely have a few less air wings 
and at least two more carriers. Since each carrier 
services approximately one wing of attack air- 
craft, the net figures remain unchanged. 
Extrapolating from Aspin's figures, one may 
now configure each U.S. pebble as composed of 
3 divisions of ground forces, 3 carrier battle 
groups (including a Marine expeditionary force) 
and 5 air wings (approximately 375 aircraft). 
Reserves are not included in these figures, as 
their impact is felt most substantially in longer 
wars, given their need for mobilization and com- 
bat training.5 Regional wars will remain the 
province of regular American forces, much as 
regular Roman legions bore the brunt of the 
empire's defensive and deterrent needs. As with 
the previous cases, this analysis also excludes 
allied forces for purposes of contingency 
planning. 
The preceding calculations allot 4 pebbles to 
the United States.6 Figure 4 represents the strate- 
gic schematic of the United States in the post- 
Cold War world, which has a complexity of 1. It 
substantially resembles the pentagonal example 
from Figure 1; but, because of the ability to move 
from the United States directly to either Europe 
or the Near East, this figure provides a some- 
what easier set of solutions, and fractionally 
reduced complexity. Rather than recapitulate the 
analysis of the pentagonal example, the most 
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Note: Cost of Movement from Europe to Near East is still "1" 
Figure 4. Strategic Schematic of The United States 
relevant strategic options and costs can be easily 
displayed in Table 2. 
For purposes of achieving a single win, strat- 
egy VII provides the least costly option, and also 
allows for rapid (one move) response to either of 
the two unoccupied nodes, Europe and the Near 
East. The implication for policy here is to 
de-emphasize Europe and the Mediterranean.7 
However, among multi-nodal configurations, 
only strategies II and XI provide a win-win 
option; and this approach creates, in the former 
instance, a powerful presence in the Levant 
whose implications, for the Balkans, the 
Maghreb and the rest of the Arab world, would 
Strategy 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
VII 
VIII 
IX 
X 
XI 
XII 
United 
States 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
4 
3 
1 
3 
3 
Table 2. U.S. Strategic Options 
Node 
Europe Levant South 
Asia 
Far 
East 
2 
1 
2 
1 
Note: Only Strategies II, VIII and XI achieve "win win" conditions. 
Cost, 
1 win 
4 
3 
4 
3 
4 
4 
2 
6 
4 
4 
4 
5 
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be profound. In the latter case, a much greater 
standing presence in the Muslim world is also 
implied. As both strategies call for increased 
presence in those areas where political pressures 
for "minimized presence" are greatest, they 
might prove difficult to pursue in practice. 
In terms of deterrence, Strategy II would 
respond at a cost of 1 to any first war; but deter- 
rence of a second conflict could be weakened, as 
two moves might be needed to respond in the 
latter case. For example, with 2 pebbles each in 
the United States and the Eastern Mediter- 
ranean, a war in Europe would necessitate mov- 
ing 1 from either node. If forces came from the 
U.S., then responding to a second war in the Far 
East would require staging forces from the 
Eastern Mediterranean through the United 
States on their way to this war, at a cost of 2. If 
the initial response came from the forces in the 
Mediterranean, then a second war in South Asia 
would necessitate a response from the United 
States, through the Mediterranean, then on to the 
scene of the conflict. 
It should also be noted that pulling U.S. 
forces home (VIII) raises response time substan- 
tially, to treble the cost of the most effective 
single-war strategy (VII), and double that of 
the only multi-nodal strategy that allows a 
"win win." However, an "all-U.S." configura- 
tion does allow a win-win situation, albeit at 
costs that could run as high as 3 to reach the 
second war if, for example, the first war were 
in Europe, and the second broke out in South 
Asia. This implies an even greater weakening 
of deterrence through adherence to a strict 
depth defense that would allow the initial 
overrun of peripheral areas. 
Finally, if, for whatever reason, the United 
States were to shift to a one-war strategy, then it 
could achieve a win with only three pebbles, a 
25% reduction beyond those cuts currently envi- 
sioned to reach base-force goals. This would, 
however, put the United States in a position 
from which it could not, given its resources, cope 
with a second conflict in a timely manner. Also, 
response to distant crises would be slower, 
weakening deterrence. 
With regard to the insights provided by the 
historical examples, the key point is that both 
cases confirm the logical correctness of shifting 
to depth defenses under conditions of scarcity. 
However, the reduction in forward presence, 
coupled with the time needed to respond to dis- 
tant crises, also showed that depth defense may 
vitiate deterrence stability. Thus, there exists a 
tension between efficient defense, employing an 
economy of force, and robust deterrence. Of 
course, this finding rests on the notion that suc- 
cessful deterrence generally depends upon the 
maintenance of a viable defensive force (as 
opposed to "flag-waving" detachments), either 
in the threatened region, or near enough so as to 
provide a rapid response. This formulation has 
received strong theoretical and empirical sup- 
port in recent years, notably from Mearsheimer 
(1983), Huth and Russett (1984, 1988) and Huth 
(1988). Others (Jervis, Lebow and Stein, 1985; 
and Payne, 1992) have pointed out the consistent 
perceptual problems that aggressors have exhib- 
ited throughout history, reinforcing the point 
that robust deterrence may depend on having 
viable defensive capabilities in place, or nearby, 
in a crisis. 
Finally, this formal analysis of the American 
strategic situation suggests the possibility of 
shifting deployments in Europe away from the 
central plains of Germany to the Mediterranean. 
Such a move improves response time to any 
South Asian crisis. It would also, no doubt, shore 
up deterrence against the spread of unrest from 
the Balkans, or against any sort of missile threats 
from the Maghreb. One policy implication might 
thus be to give very serious consideration to 
Albania's application for NATO membership. 
Given the apparent waning of the Russian 
threat, a southward shift of U.S. forces, strategi- 
cally optimal from a graphing perspective, could 
take advantage of an opportunity to enhance 
security throughout the Mediterranean, from the 
Balearics to the Balkans. 
CONCLUSION 
Several insights have emerged from apply- 
ing the graphing methodology described herein. 
Most significantly, this approach helps both in 
identifying optimal strategies and determining 
the minimum level of resources required for 
effective deterrence and defense. Also, the 
methodology can detect and then quantify the 
effects that reduced or increased force levels 
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have on marginal costs. Finally, this study pro- 
vides a verdict on the prospects for successful 
"win win" depth defense, confirming that the 
"base force minus" reductions which the U.S. 
military currently endures do not, of themselves, 
compromise its ability to fight and win two 
regional conflicts with near simultaneity. Further, 
if American strategy were to shift to a willing- 
ness to fight one war at a time, U.S. forces could 
reduce to even lower levels. In this case, though, 
deterrence could be substantially weakened, as 
the response time needed to reach most crises 
would lengthen considerably 
One should remain cautious regarding the 
applicability of formally- derived findings such 
as those generated in this study. While the math- 
ematics of graphing may imply an ability to 
reduce forces sharply, thanks to optimized rede- 
ployments, the political reality of maintaining 
minimal standing forces is that considerable 
institutional opposition will likely arise. Indeed, 
one of the lessons of the Vietnam War for the 
American military was that overwhelming force 
should be applied whenever possible. Examples 
of this philosophy abound, from the massive 
expeditionary forces that descended upon one 
Cuban construction detachment in Grenada (as 
opposed to the losing "shoestring" forces that 
invaded Cuba in 1961 at the Bay of Pigs), to the 
preponderant forces that quickly overran the 
various militia-like "dignity battalions" of 
Noriega in Panama. Even the Iraqis, the 
strongest of America's recent adversaries in war, 
found themselves confronted by overwhelming 
air, sea and ground forces of the United States.8 
The point here is that there may be organiza- 
tional, bureaucratic political, or even prudent 
strategic reasons for wanting to have more forces 
than required by some theoretically-derived 
minimum level. After all, moving toward any 
minimum requirement entails risk. One can 
hardly quarrel with such "perturbing" factors, in 
terms of their existence. However, one may 
employ the arguments advanced in this study to 
determine "bottom line" requirements accurately. 
In this regard, the graphing methodology pro- 
vides a value-neutral framework for analysis 
that may help to mitigate the natural tensions 
that arise between a desire for robust security 
and the need to operate under ever more con- 
strained fiscal circumstances. 
Finally, this methodology has generated the 
insight that marginal increases over bare- 
minimum force requirements can have very sub- 
stantial effects in terms of improving coverage of 
key areas and response time in an international 
crisis. In the generic model (the "pentagon" of 
Figure 1), one pebble more than the minimum 
reduced costs of response by 50%. This means, in 
theory, that deterrence stability could be deci- 
sively enhanced with modestly larger forces. The 
implication for American defense policy may be 
that, even though the base force can achieve the 
"win win" grand strategy, its minimalist nature 
may weaken deterrence in crisis, leading to the 
outbreak of, and American involvement in, more 
wars. If this is true, then it behooves U.S. policy- 
makers to contemplate the deterrent and stabiliz- 
ing effects of having just one more "pebble." 
ENDNOTES 
1
 Friedberg (1988), in his examination of Britain 
in the pre-World War I period, notes both some 
efforts to retrench, but also reflects on the terri- 
ble tension caused by "trying to continue to 
play the part of a world power without being 
willing to pay for the privilege" (p. 303). 
2
 For the purposes of this study, it is assumed 
that all nodes, or regions, are "created equal." 
That is, one pebble can win anywhere, even 
though the cost of moving one a great distance 
may be great, once there it performs as well as 
it would nearer to home. Much evidence sup- 
ports the notion that the Roman legions fought 
at a relatively constant level of military effec- 
tiveness across a wide variety of regions. 
Similarly, the U.S. forces, that had been devel- 
oped and trained for combat in Central Europe 
made a smooth transition to desert warfare in 
the war against Saddam Hussein. 
3
 The cost structure employed herein also 
captures the essence of the problem associated 
with the movement of expeditionary forces: the 
ability to move depends upon having rearward 
infrastructure. In U.S. practice, this notion of 
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the "rotation base" forms a central element in 
American force projection capabilities. 
4
 Similarly, while one may have allies, it is pru- 
dent (and a standard practice) in contingency 
planning to set military requirements on the 
basis of having to fight on occasion without 
militarily effective (e.g., the GCC states' armed 
forces in 1990) allies. 
5
 Two other assumptions underlay these calcula- 
tions. First, it will remain necessary, for the 
foreseeable future, to move heavy forces by sea 
to any given region. Second, conventional war 
has not yet reached a stage at which American 
information and other high technology, includ- 
ed space-based weapons, have significantly 
lessened the need for large field forces. 
6
 The aggregate requirement for twelve divisions 
is met by combining the ten Army divisions 
with the three Marine divisions that will con- 
tinue in existence. This leaves a slight overage. 
7
 It is assumed, for political reasons, that at least 
1 pebble will have to remain in the continental 
United States and its environs. 
8
 Indeed, Aspin (1992, 29-34) argues forcefully 
that the Iraqis had considerably fewer troops 
in and around Kuwait than the half-million 
figure commonly assumed. The actual Iraqi 
order of battle could have had as few as 
183,000 troops. Of course, U.S. air and naval 
mastery made the odds against the outnum- 
bered Iraqis much worse. 
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